Journal of National Security Law & Policy

Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity

Steven L. Schooner — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 13:21:32 +0000

When a nation deploys ground forces, an inverse relationship exists between the number of military deaths and public support. This stark and monolithic metric, which economists call the “casualty sensitivity” effect, requires close examination today. On the modern battlefield, contractor personnel die at rates similar to — or indeed often in excess of — soldiers, yet the U.S. public and Congress remain largely unaware of this “substitution.” This article explains the phenomenon, identifies some of the challenges and complexities associated with quantifying and qualifying the real price of combat in a modern outsourced military, and encourages greater transparency.

Virtual Checkpoints and Cyber-Terry Stops: Digital Scans To Protect the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

Scott J. Glick — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 13:10:43 +0000

The cybersecurity risks to the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources are significant and increasing every day. While a sound legal basis exists for the government to use computer intrusion detection technology to protect its own networks, critical infrastructure and key resources, primarily owned by the private sector, are governed by a different set of constitutional principles and laws. This article explores the potential for a new cybersecurity exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and individualized suspicion requirements. By viewing cybersecurity through a protective Fourth Amendment lens, as opposed to a criminal, intelligence, or military lens, fairly well established legal frameworks from the physical world can be applied to cyberspace to enable the government to use technology to identify malicious digital codes that may be attacking the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. The article argues that reasonable and limited digital scans at virtual checkpoints in cyberspace, which are binary and do not initially expose the contents of the communications to human review, and ”cyber-Terry stops,” are a constitutional and effective way to minimize the cybersecurity risks to the nation. The article proposes that Congress consider and enact sensible new legislation that will specifically enable the government to take remedial and other protective actions in cyberspace within the constitutional framework that has enabled this nation to prosper.

Outsourcing Covert Activities

Laura A. Dickinson — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:23:31 +0000

Over the past decade, the United States has radically shifted the way it projects its power overseas. Instead of using full-time employees of foreign affairs agencies to implement its policies, the government now deploys a wide range of contractors and grantees, hired by both for-profit and nonprofit entities. Thus, while traditionally we relied on diplomats, spies, and soldiers to protect and promote our interests abroad, increasingly we have turned to hired guns. Contrast the first Gulf War to later conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the Gulf War the ratio of contractors to troops was 1 to 100; now, with approximately 260,000 contractors working for the State Department, Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Iraq and Afghanistan, that ratio has
often exceeded 1 to 1. To be sure, U.S. history is rich with examples of contractors; the privateers of the Revolutionary period are a case in point. But our current turn to privatized labor does reflect a new trend, spurred by the post-Cold War decline of the standing military and the elimination of the draft, supported by the public’s faith (not always backed up by data) that the private sector can perform work more efficiently than government employees, and fueled by the exigencies of the war on terror in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Many of these modern contractors perform logistics functions, such as delivering meals to troops or cleaning latrines on the battlefield. Others guard diplomats, convoys, and military bases. But contractors have also gathered intelligence,
interrogated detainees, and engaged in tactical maneuvers, sometimes under circumstances involving hostile fire.

Shadow Wars

William C. Banks — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:22:18 +0000

Those of us who remember the 1980s lived through the Iran-Contra Affair and its labyrinth of arms-for-hostages deals, secret transfers of U.S. government funds, backdoor support for the Nicaraguan Contras after Congress cut off funding, and the duplicity of Reagan administration officials who tried to hide and then cover up what they were doing. Some of us even recall the covert war in Laos and Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s where the U.S. military, the CIA, and various paramilitaries pursued Communist forces in campaigns that were common knowledge in the region but kept secret from Congress and the American people. A few seasoned chroniclers of our national security are even able to remember earlier secret support for paramilitary forces, coup attempts, and a plethora of covert operations that were undertaken by the United States as an adjunct to its Cold War with the Soviet Union.

In the post-9/11 environment, the United States confronted the Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated terrorist and insurgent groups, where the conventional military force that quickly forced Iraq’s retreat from Kuwait and subdued the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s was far less effective. Paramilitary campaigns waged by the CIA and contractors became an integral part of the counterterrorism response to these new enemies, and our military greatly expanded its own capabilities to collect intelligence and carry out clandestine operations. Over time, first in the Bush administration and now in an expanded and more aggressive strategy by the Obama administration, the United States has been conducting what The New York Times described as a “shadow war against Al Qaeda and its allies”:

In roughly a dozen countries – from the deserts of North Africa, to
the mountains of Pakistan, to former Soviet republics crippled by
ethnic and religious strife – the United States has significantly
increased military and intelligence operations, pursuing the enemy
using robotic drones and commando teams, paying contractors to
spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists.

Basic Principles of the War Power

Louis Fisher — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:21:21 +0000

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution assigned to Congress many of the powers of external affairs previously vested in the English king. That allocation of authority is central to America’s democratic and constitutional system. When decisions about armed conflict, whether overt or covert, slip from the elected members of Congress, the principles of self-government and popular sovereignty are undermined. Political power shifts to an executive branch with two elected officials and a long history of costly, poorly conceived military commitments. The Framers anticipated and warned against the hazards of Executive wars. In a republican form of government, the sovereign power rests with the citizens and the individuals they elect to public office. Congress alone was given the constitutional authority to initiate war.

Legislative control over external affairs took centuries to develop. The English Parliament gained the power of the purse in the 1660s to restrain the king, but the power to initiate war remained a monarchical prerogative. In his Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690), John Locke identified three functions of government: legislative, executive, and “federative.” The last embraced “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth.” To Locke, the federative power (what today we call foreign policy) was “always almost united” with the Executive. Any effort to separate the executive and federative powers, he counseled, would invite “disorder and ruin.”

The Great War Powers Misconstruction

Herbert L. Fenster — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:20:17 +0000

The term “war” is found at four locations in our Constitution. However, the word alone signals nothing about the powers of the two political branches the Constitution creates, executive and legislative, and nowhere in the Constitution does the term “war powers” appear. At some point in our history, the word “powers” was coupled with “war.” There has ensued a continuing argument about who, as between the President and Congress, owns those powers. But little or no attention has been given to just what powers are being discussed, and no attention at all has been given to what the Constitution itself says about those powers. Yet, a close examination of the Constitution readily reveals the answers. Congress owns all of the powers to create and field a military (no matter how the powers are defined), and the President has the executive authority. The involvement of the United States in multiple military conflicts, ultimately at the behest of the President and not the Congress, is evidence that currently both the executive and legislative branches operate contrary to the mandates of the Constitution. Thus, the notion of war powers must be reconsidered.

The Continuing Quandary of Covert Operations

John Prados — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:19:16 +0000

In May 2011, shortly after a special operations team of Navy SEALs killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, there was a fresh surge of enthusiasm for covert operations. That is unfortunate because, behind the scenes, secret warfare is actually in crisis. We need to re-examine the suitability and constitutionality of covert operations and, among other things, devise a sound constitutional framework for conducting them.

I. HOST COUNTRY REACTIONS: PAKISTAN
A delegation of Pakistani officials recently completed a visit to Washington for very private talks about a secret war. Representing that nation’s premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and headed by its chief, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Pakistani delegation came to America to rein in the CIA. While CIA spokesmen put the best possible face on this event – calling the talks “productive” – there was no real meeting of the minds. The raid on bin Laden, executed without reference to Pakistani sovereignty, added insult to injury, since Pakistani demands to be kept fully informed of U.S. activities were clearly ignored in the SEAL operation. And just to pile on, American pundits, including former CIA director Leon Panetta, proceeded to accuse Pakistan of complicity or incompetence, given bin Laden’s presence in a Pakistani garrison town. Observers should be in no doubt that this moment marks a watershed in the South Asian secret war. Much like the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam conflict, the event signifies the instant when U.S. capabilities peak, past which further escalation on any plane becomes less probable.

Conducting Shadow Wars

Jennifer D. Kibbe — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:16:56 +0000

When al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks, it also thrust the United States on a decade-long (and counting) search for the best way to combat the unconventional threat posed by terrorism. That search evolved into a competition of sorts between the military’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the paramilitary operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the prestige and resources that went with leading the fight against terrorism. Within less than a decade, however, various officials involved in counterterrorism policy were trying to combine the two groups of operators in a way that maximized the advantages and minimized the risks and constraints of each group.

Many critics of the George W. Bush administration’s wholehearted push into the realm of shadow wars – covert operations in countries with which the United States was not at war – assumed that the situation would improve when Barack Obama became President. To the surprise of many, if not most, of his campaign supporters, however, President Obama has, in some ways, become an even more ardent supporter of shadow wars than his predecessor. And, as this article will show, just about every indication points to a further expansion of this hybrid military and intelligence activity in countries beyond war zones. It is imperative, therefore, that we more clearly understand how these shadow wars are being conducted and by whom, and whether they are subject to adequate oversight and accountability.

Covert War and the Constitution

Jules Lobel — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:15:57 +0000

The question of whether the President has the constitutional power to authorize covert paramilitary actions or shadow wars against other nations or entities first surfaced at the beginnings of the American republic and continues to vex policymakers today. As early as 1806, in the case of United States v. Smith, two civilians being tried for attempting to launch a paramilitary expedition from the United States against Spanish America claimed that their covert activities had been secretly approved by President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Supreme Court Justice William Paterson, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, who presided over the trial, held that the defense’s proffered testimony was immaterial, because the Constitution,

[W]hich measures out the powers and defines the duties of the
president, does not vest in him any authority to set on foot a
military expedition against a nation with which the United States
are at peace. . . . If then, the president knew and approved of the
military expedition . . . it would not justify the defendant . . .
because the president does not possess a dispensing power. Does
he possess the power of making war? That power is exclusively
vested in congress; for by the eighth section of the 1st article of the
constitution, it is ordained, that congress shall have power to
declare war, [and] grant letters of marque and reprisal . . . .

Covert War and the Constitution: A Response

Robert F. Turner — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:15:00 +0000

Words are imperfect instruments for conveying ideas, and interpreting the intended meaning of words is often a challenge, especially when more than two centuries have passed since the words were written and their meanings have evolved over the years. For example, the terms “executive power” and “declare war” had widely understood meanings when the Constitution was written. In his classic 1922 study, The Control of American Foreign Relations, Quincy Wright explained that “when the constitutional convention gave ‘executive power’ to the President, the foreign relations power was the essential element in the grant, but they carefully protected this power from abuse by provisions for senatorial or congressional veto.” Wright referred to the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone5 as “the political Bibles of the constitutional fathers,”6 adding: “In foreign affairs . . . the controlling
force is the reverse of that in domestic legislation. The initiation and development of details is with the President, checked only by the veto of the Senate or Congress upon completed proposals.”

The Constitutionality of Covert War: Rebuttals

Jules Lobel — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:13:49 +0000

Professor Turner argues that Congress’s power to “declare war” and issue letters of marque and reprisal is an irrelevant “anachronism” in today’s world, and was virtually irrelevant even in 1787. According to Turner, the Declare War Clause only prevents the President from launching “a major aggressive war.” In his view, the President has the power to launch “minor” aggressive wars and even initiate “major” warfare (“major” is not defined) when such warfare can broadly be termed “defensive,” a vague term also not defined by Turner. Of course, no sane President would openly claim to launch an “aggressive” (or in eighteenth century parlance, an unjust war). For example, President George W. Bush asserted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was “defensive” although Iraq had neither attacked us nor was imminently threatening to do so, and the invasion was widely viewed by the world community as violative of the U.N. Charter. Turner’s interpretation of the Declare War Clause, of which James Madison wrote, “in no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found,” reduces this important provision to a virtual nullity, easily evaded by the executive’s claim that a war is either “defensive,” or not “major.”

The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing

Afsheen John Radsan — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:08:44 +0000

Just suppose. The Attorney General, lanky as the President, walks into the Oval Office to join a meeting. The top law enforcement officer is slumped down with apparent bad news. He avoids eye contact with the Commander-in-Chief. “Mr. President,” he says looking down at the coffee table, “the ACLU believes our drone program is illegal.” Silence. (The President and the Attorney General both, of course, maintain links to the human rights community, an important part of their political base.) The President’s other advisers fidget and twitch. The Vice President adjusts the
coaster under his drink. Beads of perspiration form on some faces. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense look for the exit; the law is not their thing.

The President is cool. “Could you be more specific,” he says, tapping his finger on a black briefing book.

The Attorney General looks up from the table. “The drone strikes in Pakistan. Remember, the program Leon was not supposed to talk about with the media.”

The President smiles. “Yes, I know that. But which laws are they talking about?”

After an awkward pause, the President, himself a highly sophisticated lawyer, suggests, “Let’s talk this through some more.” The Attorney General agrees. After the lawyer-to-lawyer exchange, the other advisers relax. Maybe the CIA drone strikes are not illegal after all. Or maybe the apparent illegality does not matter that much. The Vice President takes a sip of his drink. And the President asks for tea and coffee to be served. No one wants to leave the room after all. They open their briefing books instead.

This scenario emphasizes a simple point: President Obama, a Harvard Law School graduate, a former teacher of constitutional law at the University of Chicago and a Nobel Peace Laureate, must believe that he has the authority to order the CIA to fire missiles from drones to kill suspected terrorists. Not everyone agrees with him, though.

White House Decisionmaking Involving Paramilitary Forces

Richard M. Pious — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:07:28 +0000

The standard framework for understanding presidential decision making in projecting American power and influence into other countries is to assume that the Administration develops diplomatic, military or covert options which the President then assigns to State, Defense or the CIA (sometimes in combination). This framework is incomplete, because diplomacy is carried on not only by officers of the United States but also by an “invisible presidency” of informal emissaries. Military operations are conducted not only by members of the U.S. Armed Forces – whether conventional or special operations forces – but also by others with arms (paramilitaries) with whom American armed forces or intelligence agents propose to have (or already have) a formal or informal working arrangement. Covert operations are supplied, financed and conducted not only by the CIA (and recently the Pentagon), but also by private organizations with ties to the government, such as in the Iran-Contra Affair, when arms dealers were granted extraordinary access to intelligence resources and stocks of military weapons.

Intelligence Analysis and Planning for Paramilitary Operations

Loch K. Johnson — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:03:17 +0000

Paramilitary operations – “PM ops” in American spytalk – may be defined as secret war-like activities. They are a part of a broader set of endeavors undertaken by intelligence agencies to manipulate events abroad, when so ordered by authorities in the executive branch. These activities are known collectively as “covert action” (CA) or, alternatively, “special activities,” “the quiet option,” or “the third option” (between diplomacy and overt military intervention). In addition to PM ops, CA includes secret political and economic operations, as well as the use of propaganda. Often
used synergically, each form is meant to help nudge the course of history – insofar as this is possible – in a direction favorable to the United States. Since the creation of the modern U.S. “intelligence community” by way of the National Security Act of 1947, PM ops have been conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), known by insiders as “The Agency.”

This article offers a brief history of America’s paramilitary activities, with special attention to the relationship between intelligence analysis – the attempts by the CIA and its fifteen companion agencies to understand contemporary world events and forecast how they will unfold – and the use of paramilitary forces to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.

Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis

Peter M. Shane — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 18:02:14 +0000

Presidential advisers, both Democratic and Republican, long ago discovered ways to magnify presidential power at the cost of legal principles and the system of checks and balances. This essay briefly considers the limits to executive branch capacity to provide reliable legal and constitutional analysis in times of emergency, including covert military operations. It highlights the special risks government faces when the circle of presidential advisers narrows because of highly classified operations and there is less opportunity for senior officials, including attorneys, to pass judgment on pending initiatives.

Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate

Robert M. Chesney — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 14:32:44 +0000

Leon Panetta appeared on PBS Newshour not long after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. He was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time, and during the course of the interview he took up the question of the CIA’s role in the attack. It had been “a ‘title 50’ operation,” he explained, invoking the section of the U.S. Code that authorizes the activities of the CIA. As a result, Panetta added, he had exercised overall “command.”

This surely confused at least some observers. The mission had been executed by U.S. Navy SEALs from Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) after all, and both operational and tactical command seemed to have resided at all times with JSOC personnel. But for those who had been following the evolution of the CIA and JSOC during the post-9/11 period, Panetta’s account would not have been surprising. The bin Laden raid was, from this perspective, merely the latest example of an ongoing process of convergence among military and intelligence activities, institutions, and
authorities.

United States v. Boyd (E.D.N.C. Sep. 14, 2011) (yes, another guilty

Administrator — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 20:11:35 +0000

* United States v. Boyd (E.D.N.C. Sep. 14, 2011) (yes, another guilty plea)

Well, I spoke to soon. Another DOJ win in a terrorism case. You have to admire the concatenation of inchoateness in this particular charge: aiding-and-abetting a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, where that underlying material support offense in turn is predicated on support being provided to persons involved in a conspiracy to commit murder abroad in violation of 18 USC 956(a). Restated, that’s (i) aiding and abetting (ii) a conspiracy to provide (iii) material support to (iv) a conspiracy to (v) commit murder abroad). Whew! From the press release:

RALEIGH, N.C. – Dylan Boyd, aka “Mohammed,” pleaded guilty today in federal court in New Bern, N.C., to one count of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, announced Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Thomas G. Walker, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina; M. Chris Briese, Special Agent-in-Charge of the FBI Charlotte Division; and John F. Khin, Special Agent-in-Charge, Southeast Field Office, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

Boyd, 24, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina, was first charged along with seven other defendants in a federal indictment returned on July 22, 2009. He was arrested on July 29, 2009, and the indictment was unsealed. On Sept. 24, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment in the case.

According to the superseding indictment, from before November 2006 through at least July 2009, Boyd aided and abetted other named defendants and others who conspired to provide material support and resources to terrorists, including currency, training, transportation and personnel. The object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping or maiming persons abroad.

The indictment alleges that, as part of the conspiracy, Boyd assisted other defendants as they prepared themselves to engage in violent jihad and were willing to die as martyrs. They also allegedly offered training in weapons and financing, and helped arrange overseas travel and contacts so others could wage violent jihad overseas. In addition, as part of the conspiracy, the defendants raised money to support training efforts, disguised the destination of such monies from the donors and obtained assault weapons to develop skills with the weapons. Some defendants also allegedly radicalized others to believe that violent jihad was a personal religious obligation.

At sentencing, Boyd faces a potential 15 years in prison followed by three years of supervised release for aiding and abetting a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

Boyd’s father and co-defendant, Daniel Patrick Boyd, pleaded guilty on Feb. 9, 2011, to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and one count of conspiracy to murder kidnap, maim and injure persons in a foreign country. Boyd’s brother and co-defendant, Zakariya Boyd, pleaded guilty on June 7, 2011, to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. Trial for the remaining co-defendants in custody is scheduled for September 2011.

…

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Harpham (E.D. Wash. Sep. 7, 2011)

Administrator — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 20:11:34 +0000

* United States v. Harpham (E.D. Wash. Sep. 7, 2011) (guilty plea)

Ok, this should be it for today. Last week was a busy one for DOJ in terrorism cases!

In this case, Kevin Harhpham has pled guilty to placing an IED along the planned route for the MLK Day parade in Spokane last January. The details from the press release below.

SPOKANE, Wash. – Kevin William Harpham, 37, of Colville, Wash., pleaded guilty today to the placement of the improvised explosive device alongside the planned Martin Luther King Jr. Day Unity March on Jan. 17, 2011, in Spokane, Wash., announced the Department of Justice.

On March 9, 2011, Harpham was arrested and charged by complaint with the crimes of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and possession of an unregistered explosive device. Today, Harpham pleaded guilty to two counts of a superseding indictment, charging Harpham with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempt to commit a federal hate crime. The Martin Luther King Jr. Day Unity March was attended by hundreds of individuals, including racial minorities. The explosive device placed by Harpham was capable of inflicting serious injury or death, according to laboratory analysis conducted by the FBI.

…

The plea agreement calls for a sentence of between 27 and 32 years in prison. The plea agreement is subject to the district court’s review acceptance and determination of the final sentence. The plea agreement also calls for a lifetime term of court supervision after Harpham is released from prison.

…

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Payen (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2011)

Administrator — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 20:11:32 +0000

* United States v. Payen (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2011) (25 year sentence in NY terror plot)

From the press release:

NEW YORK – Laguerre Payen was sentenced today to 25 years in prison for plotting to bomb synagogues in the Riverdale section of the Bronx, N.Y., and to use Stinger surface-to-air guided missiles to shoot down military planes located at the New York Air National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, N.Y., announced Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

Payen was convicted along with James Cromitie, David Williams and Onta Williams in October 2010 after a two-month jury trial. U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon presided over the trial and imposed today’s sentence.

“Laguerre Payen was a willing participant in a plot to use bombs and missiles to target New York synagogues and U.S. military planes,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara. “Although these weapons were fake, the defendant believed they were real, and today’s sentence underscores the gravity of these crimes.”

According to the evidence presented at trial and other documents and proceedings in this case:

In June 2008, an informant working with the FBI was approached by Cromitie in Newburgh. Cromitie explained to the informant that his parents had lived in Afghanistan and that he was upset about the war there. Cromitie expressed interest in returning to Afghanistan and said that if he were to die a martyr, he would go to “paradise.” He also expressed an interest in doing “something to America.” The following month, Cromitie and the informant discussed Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based designated foreign terrorist organization, with which the informant claimed to be involved. Cromitie stated that he would be interested in joining the organization to “do jihad.”

During further meetings with the informant, Cromitie, Payen, David Williams and Onta Williams discussed their desire to attack certain targets in New York, including synagogues in the Bronx and military aircraft located at the Air National Guard Base in Newburgh. Cromitie asked the informant to supply surface-to-air guided missiles and explosives for the planned operations. The informant responded that he could provide Cromitie with C-4 plastic explosives.

After Cromitie, Payen, David Williams and Onta Williams selected the synagogues they intended to target and conducted surveillance of military planes at the Air National Guard Base, Cromitie, Payen and David Williams drove with the informant toward Stamford, Ct., to obtain what the defendants believed would be a surface-to-air guided missile system and three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) containing C-4 plastic explosive material. The informant provided the defendants with a Stinger surface-to-air guided missile provided by the FBI that was not capable of being fired, telling the defendants that he had obtained it from Jaish-e-Mohammed. The informant also provided three IEDs that each contained over 30 pounds of inert C-4 plastic explosives, again telling the defendants that he had obtained them from Jaish-e-Mohammed. Cromitie, Payen and David Williams transported these weapons back to Newburgh on May 6, 2009.

Two days later, Cromitie, Payen, David Williams and Onta Williams met to inspect the “missile system” and the “explosive devices” and to further discuss the logistics of the operation. On May 13, 2009, they returned to Stamford and picked up another Stinger missile. Law enforcement officers arrested the four men on May 20, 2009, right after they planted the IEDs outside of two synagogues in Riverdale.

Payen, Cromitie, David Williams and Onta Williams were each found guilty by a jury of one count of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction within the United States, three counts of attempting to use weapons of mass destruction within the United States, one count of conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, one count of attempting to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and one count of conspiracy to kill officers and employees of the United States. Cromitie and David Williams were also found guilty by a jury of one count of attempting to kill officers and employees of the United States.

In addition to the prison term, Judge McMahon sentenced Payen, 29, of Newburgh, to five years of supervised release and ordered him to pay a $700 special assessment fee. Cromitie, David Williams and Onta Williams were sentenced to 25 years in prison on June 29, 2011.

….

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Akhtar (D. Maryland Sep. 9, 2011)

Administrator — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 20:11:31 +0000

Journal of National Security Law & Policy

Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity

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Virtual Checkpoints and Cyber-Terry Stops: Digital Scans To Protect the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

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Outsourcing Covert Activities

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Shadow Wars

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Basic Principles of the War Power

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The Great War Powers Misconstruction

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The Continuing Quandary of Covert Operations

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Conducting Shadow Wars

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Covert War and the Constitution

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Covert War and the Constitution: A Response

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The Constitutionality of Covert War: Rebuttals

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The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing

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White House Decisionmaking Involving Paramilitary Forces

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Intelligence Analysis and Planning for Paramilitary Operations

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Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis

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Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate

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United States v. Boyd (E.D.N.C. Sep. 14, 2011) (yes, another guilty

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Harpham (E.D. Wash. Sep. 7, 2011)

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Payen (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2011)

[nationalsecuritylaw] United States v. Akhtar (D. Maryland Sep. 9, 2011)